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Abstract-- Traditional electric energy markets do not explicitly 
model generator contingencies. To improve the representation of 
resources and to enhance the modeling of uncertainty, existing 
markets are moving in the direction of including generator 
contingencies and remedial action schemes within market auction 
models explicitly. This research contributes to the market design 
realm by providing detailed analysis of impending changes, it 
provides insightful guidance in understanding the market 
implications, and it provides recommendations on necessary 
changes to ensure a fair and transparent market structure. A 
primal (and the corresponding dual) formulation that accounts for 
the proposed changes to the auction model is provided to enable a 
theoretical analysis of the anticipated changes including the effect 
on market prices, settlements, and revenues. The derivation of the 
prices and the dual formulation are based on leveraging duality 
theory from linear optimization theory. A comparison to existing 
market structures is also included. The primary impact of the 
proposed changes includes the addition of a new congestion 
component within the traditional locational marginal price, which 
reflects the influence of congestion during the post-contingency 
states for the modeled critical generator contingencies. 
 
Index Terms-- Contingency reserve, generator contingency 
modeling, power system reliability, electricity market design. 
I.  NOMENCLATURE 
Sets and Indices 
𝑐 Contingency index. 
𝐶𝑔 Set of generator contingencies. 
𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
 Subset of critical (credible) generator contingencies, 
𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
⊆ 𝐶𝑔. 
𝑘 Transmission asset (line or transformer) index. 
𝐾 Set of transmission assets. 
𝐾𝑐𝑟𝑡 Subset of critical transmission assets, 𝐾𝑐𝑟𝑡 ⊆ 𝐾. 
𝑛 Node (or bus) index. 
𝑁 Set of nodes. 
𝑛′(𝑐) Node index for generator loss under contingency 𝑐. 
𝑆𝐹𝑅 Set of nodes that have generators with frequency 
response capability. 
Parameters 
𝑐𝑛 Operating cost for the generator at node 𝑛. 
𝐷𝑛̅̅̅̅  Fixed real power demand at node 𝑛. 
𝐺𝐷𝐹𝑛′(𝑐),𝑛Generation loss distribution factor for contingency 𝑐 
at node 𝑛. 
                                                          
This work was supported by the Consortium for Electric Reliability 
Technology Solutions (CERTS) with the US Department of Energy (DOE), and 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency – Energy (ARPA-E) with the US 
DOE. 
𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑎
 Normal capacity (i.e., rate A) for the corresponding 
transmission asset (thermal limit or stability limit). 
Typically, 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑎 = −𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑎. 
𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐
 Emergency capacity (i.e., rate C) for the 
corresponding transmission asset. Typically, 
𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑐 = −𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐 . 
𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 Real power maximum capacity for the generator at 
node 𝑛. 
𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅  Proportion of flow on transmission asset 𝑘 resulting 
from injection of one MW at node 𝑛  and a 
corresponding withdrawal of one MW at reference 
node 𝑅. 
?̅?𝑛′(𝑐),𝑛 Recognizes the node with generator loss under 
contingency 𝑐 (1 if contingency node, else 0). 
Variables 
𝐷𝑛 Real power demand at bus 𝑛 (assumed to be perfectly 
inelastic). 
𝐹𝑘
−, 𝐹𝑘
+ Pre-contingency flowgate marginal prices. Dual 
variables (or shadow prices) on transmission asset 
𝑘 ’s normal capacity constraints; lower and upper 
bounds respectively. 
𝐹𝑘
𝑐−, 𝐹𝑘
𝑐+ Post-contingency flowgate marginal prices. Dual 
variables on critical transmission asset k’s emergency 
capacity constraints under critical contingency c; 
lower and upper bounds respectively. 
𝑃𝑛 Real power production from the generator at node 𝑛. 
𝛼𝑛 Dual variable on generator’s (at node 𝑛 ) capacity 
constraint; upper bound constraint. 
𝛿 Dual variable on system-wide power balance 
constraint (marginal energy component of LMP). 
𝜆𝑛 Locational marginal price (LMP) at node 𝑛 . Dual 
variable that signifies the increase (or decrease) to the 
primal objective if there is slightly more (or less) 
consumption by the demand at node 𝑛. 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
SOs maintain a continuous, reliable, and economically 
efficient supply of electric energy with the assistance of 
energy management systems and market management systems 
(MMSs). One key feature within the MMSs is the determination 
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of the generation dispatch and ancillary services schedule while 
respecting complex operational requirements and strict physical 
restrictions. The transmission planning standard (TPL-001-4), 
set by the NERC is an instance of one such requirement, which 
stipulates system performance requirements under both normal 
and emergency conditions [1]. Particularly, the system is 
required to recover from the loss of any single bulk element, 
e.g., a generator or a non-radial transmission element, without 
inconveniencing customers (involuntary load shedding). This 
rule is more commonly referred to as the N-1 reliability 
requirement and makes the underlying problem stochastic in 
nature. However, modeling such uncertain events within 
resource scheduling tools presents two practical barriers: (1) 
computational complexity of the resulting stochastic 
optimization problem, and (2) market barriers primarily due to 
the complications associated with pricing in a stochastic market 
environment. Consequently, most of the contemporary power 
system operational frameworks rely on deterministic 
approaches and utilize numerous approximations to handle 
uncertainties to meet the N-1 mandate. 
Today, ISOs model critical transmission contingencies in the 
market explicitly without utilizing second-stage recourse 
decision variables; post-contingency line flows are represented 
using shift factors, such as LODFs, for a subset of critical 
transmission contingencies. Decomposition techniques are 
leveraged to manage the complexity of the overall 
mathematical program by acknowledging only the constraints 
deemed to be critical. Such approaches enable an efficient 
handling of critical transmission contingencies within MMSs. 
A generator outage can also constrain the transmission system 
considerably. Generator contingencies are not modeled 
explicitly within state-of-the-art market auction models; 
instead, system or zonal operating reserve requirements are 
formed to ensure the system is reliable against generator 
contingencies. For instance, common industry practices, to 
approximate the N-1 mandate for generator contingencies, 
include simplistic policies that require a MW level of 
contingency reserve to be acquired somewhere in the system 
[2], [3]. However, such policies do not ensure reliable 
operations (or reserve deliverability) since they only capture a 
quantitative aspect [4], [5]. Moreover, such approximate, 
deterministic approaches require out-of-market corrections 
(OMCs) to adjust resource schedules to account for modeling 
inaccuracies [6], [7]. Consequently, there is a push in the 
industry to include an explicit representation of generator 
contingencies in the market auction models. 
Two-stage scenario-based stochastic programs are often 
proposed to improve operations by optimizing the system 
response, e.g., reserve activation, in the post-contingency states. 
However, recent industry movement to model generator 
contingencies suggests using pre-determined factors, such as 
generator loss distribution factors (GDFs) and zonal reserve 
deployment factors [8], [9], to approximate the system response 
to a generator contingency; such factors are analogous to the 
more familiar participation factors that are used today in real-
time contingency analysis when simulating generator 
contingencies. CAISO recently proposed to update its market 
auction models to recognize the impact of generator 
contingencies and remedial action schemes (RAS) in the 
market, explicitly, without using second-stage recourse 
decision variables [8]. Furthermore, MISO augmented their 
market auction models by modeling the loss of the largest 
generator for each zone and the corresponding system response 
in the post-contingency state, explicitly, without using second-
stage recourse decision variables [9]. MISO’s approach 
approximates post-contingency congestion on critical 
transmission interfaces due to the deployed zonal reserves. 
Moreover, the system response is modeled via zonal aggregated 
sensitivity factors and pre-determined zonal reserve 
deployment factors. With the explicit modeling of generator 
contingencies within the market auction models, the industry is 
moving away from deterministic program formulations to a 
stochastic program structure. The anticipated impacts include 
market prices that better reflect the quality of service provided 
by generators in response to a generator contingency. The main 
purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical analysis of the 
recent changes in market auction models while focusing on its 
influences on market clearing prices, i.e., locational marginal 
prices (LMPs). It investigates the impact that the explicit 
inclusion of generator contingencies will have on the market 
pricing structure using duality theory. Primal and dual 
formulations of market auction models, with and without 
explicit generator contingency modeling, derivation of the 
corresponding LMPs to demonstrate how the proposed changes 
affect market prices, settlements and revenues, are presented. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
III introduces a theoretical analysis of a contemporary market 
auction model. Section IV investigates the anticipated changes 
by providing an enhanced primal formulation for the market 
auction model and an economic interpretation of the 
corresponding dual problem, its variables, and its constraints. 
One goal is to investigate CAISO’s newly proposed (and 
related) payment structure in greater detail. Note that, in the 
following discussions, GDFs are used to model the corrective 
actions approximately without using a recourse decision 
variable. Finally, Section V concludes this paper and 
summarizes potential future work. 
III.  DUAL PROBLEMS OF ELECTRIC ENERGY MARKET 
FORMULATIONS 
A.  Background on Duality Theory for Linear Optimization 
In linear optimization, there is the primal problem, the 
problem at hand. In this case, the problem of interest is the 
direct current optimal power flow (DCOPF) problem or a 
security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) problem. Each 
primal problem then has a corresponding dual problem and 
together they form what is known in linear optimization theory 
as a primal-dual pair. The dual problem can be interpreted as an 
optimization problem that is searching for the tightest lower 
bound (when the primal is a minimization problem); it also 
provides the shadow prices (dual variables) corresponding to 
the constraints in the primal. Dual variables, based on linear 
optimization theory, can also be interpreted as the 
corresponding Lagrange multipliers for the constraints within 
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the primal. From the perspective of an economist, they are 
interpreted as shadow prices. The constraints within the dual 
describe the relationships between the dual variables. Likewise, 
the primal variables are the corresponding shadow prices for the 
dual constraints. 
The following example demonstrates the relationship 
between the primal-dual pair, where 𝐚𝐢  is a row and 𝐀𝐣  is a 
column from a given A matrix that captures the constraint set 
(which consists of 𝑀  constraints: 𝑀1 ≥ constraints, 𝑀2 ≤ 
constraints, and 𝑀3 =  constraints) for the primal; each 
constraint has a scalar 𝑏𝑖. In addition, c is the cost vector and X 
is the vector of primal variables, where 𝑁1, 𝑁2, and 𝑁3 denote 
the subset of non-negative, non-positive and unrestricted primal 
variables respectively. Also, p denotes the penalty (or shadow) 
price for violating the corresponding primal constraint. This 
primal-dual pair presentation can be found in a variety of 
textbooks, including [10]. 
 
Primal: Dual: 
Minimize: 𝐜𝐓𝐗 Maximize: 𝐩𝐓𝐛 
Subject to: Subject to: 
𝐚𝐢
𝐓𝐗 ≥ 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀1 𝑝𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀1 
𝐚𝐢
𝐓𝐗 ≤ 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀2 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 0, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀2 
𝐚𝐢
𝐓𝐗 = 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀3 𝑝𝑖: free, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀3 
𝑥𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁1 𝐩
𝐓𝐀𝐣 ≤ 𝑐𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁1 
𝑥𝑗 ≤ 0, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁2 𝐩
𝐓𝐀𝐣 ≥ 𝑐𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁2 
𝑥𝑗: free, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁3 𝐩
𝐓𝐀𝐣 = 𝑐𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁3. 
 
Prior work related to optimization problems for power 
systems derive the properties of the prices, which come from 
the dual formulation, based on applying Karush-Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions and simplifying the equations [11]-[20]. Note that 
the dual formulation is derived by creating a Lagrangian dual 
and then simplifying it into the form presented above. 
Leveraging the known properties for a primal-dual pair for 
linear optimization models is used in this paper since it is more 
concise and straightforward [14]. 
B.  The Dual Formulation for a Standard DCOPF Problem 
This subsection provides an explicit formulation of the 
primal-dual pair for the DCOPF problem, which is a simplified 
representation of existing market formulations that generally 
come in the form of a security-constrained unit commitment 
(SCUC) or a SCED model. Most of the contemporary market 
models use a linearized DCOPF formulation that is based on 
PTDFs instead of the B-θ formulation that relies on the 
susceptance of transmission assets (B) and the bus voltage 
angles (θ). The PTDF-based formulation is easier to solve since 
it provides the option of ignoring the transmission assets that 
are inconsequential (i.e., rarely congested), thereby reducing 
modeling complexity. A primal problem formulation for a 
standard PTDF-based DCOPF is detailed below. 
 
Minimize
𝑃𝑛,𝐷𝑛
: ∑ 𝑐𝑛𝑃𝑛𝑛  (1) 
Subject to: 
−𝑃𝑛 ≥ −𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 , ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑁           (𝜶𝒏) (2) 
∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 (𝑃𝑛𝑛 − 𝐷𝑛) ≥ −𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑎 , ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾   (𝑭𝒌
−) (3) 
−∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 (𝑃𝑛𝑛 − 𝐷𝑛) ≥ −𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑎, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾   (𝑭𝒌
+) (4) 
∑ 𝑃𝑛𝑛 − 𝐷𝑛 = 0            (𝜹) (5) 
𝐷𝑛 = 𝐷𝑛̅̅̅̅ , ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑁            (𝝀𝒏) (6) 
𝑃𝑛 ≥ 0. 
 
The objective, (1), is to minimize the linear operating costs, 
which is equivalent to maximizing the market surplus since the 
demand is assumed to be perfectly inelastic. Constraint (2) 
imposes an upper bound on the real power scheduled from a 
generating resource. Note that, for simplicity, the minimum real 
power generating capacity is assumed to be zero for all 
generating resources. The dc power flow on a transmission 
asset is constrained by its normal (thermal or stability) rating, 
i.e., rate A, in (3) and (4) respectively. The dual variables of (3) 
and (4) are the flowgate marginal prices for those transmission 
assets or flowgates; these dual variables are used to calculate 
the congestion component of the LMP. Constraint (5) assures 
system-wide power balance between generation and demand; 
the dual variable of (5) captures the energy component of the 
LMP. Note that, in this formulation, the demand is treated as a 
variable following which it is fixed to equal a parameter in (6). 
The dual variable of (6) signifies the increase (or decrease) to 
the primal objective (1) if there is slightly more (or less) 
consumption by the demand at node n, which directly translates 
into the definition of the LMP. The corresponding dual problem 
formulation for the primal problem is given below. 
 
Maximize
𝛼𝑛,𝐹𝑘
−,𝐹𝑘
+,𝛿,𝜆𝑛
: −∑ 𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛼𝑛 −∑ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑎(𝐹𝑘
− + 𝐹𝑘
+) +𝑘𝑛
∑ 𝐷𝑛̅̅̅̅𝑛 𝜆𝑛  (7) 
Subject to: 
−𝛼𝑛 + ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 (𝐹𝑘
−
𝑘 − 𝐹𝑘
+) + 𝛿 ≤ 𝑐𝑛 , ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 (𝑷𝒏) (8) 
∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 (𝐹𝑘
+
𝑘 − 𝐹𝑘
−) − 𝛿 + 𝜆𝑛 = 0, ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 (𝑫𝒏) (9) 
𝛼𝑛 ≥ 0, 𝐹𝑘
− ≥ 0, 𝐹𝑘
+ ≥ 0, 𝛿 free, 𝜆𝑛 free. 
 
At optimality, the dual objective (7) is equal to the primal 
objective (1) by strong duality. The first, second, and the third 
components of (7) denote the generation rent (short-term 
generation profit), the congestion rent, and the load payment, 
respectively. Since generation revenue is equal to generation 
cost plus generation rent, it can be proven that, at optimality, 
load payment is equal to generation revenue plus congestion 
rent. Constraints (8) and (9) represent the dual constraints 
corresponding to the generator production and the demand 
variables in the primal problem, respectively. Constraint (9) 
within the dual problem identifies 𝜆𝑛  as the LMP at node n. 
Thus, the LMP, defined by (9a), is equal to the sum of the 
marginal energy (δ) and the marginal congestion components. 
Note that, since the PTDF-based DCOPF formulation defined 
by (1)-(6) is assumed to be a lossless model, there is no loss 
component of the LMP for the work presented in this paper. 
After identifying the equation that defines the LMP via (9), (8) 
reduces to (8a). 
 
𝜆𝑛 = 𝛿 + ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 (𝐹𝑘
−
𝑘 − 𝐹𝑘
+), ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑁   (𝑫𝒏) (9a) 
−𝛼𝑛 + 𝜆𝑛 ≤ 𝑐𝑛 , ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑁.  (𝑷𝒏) (8a) 
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The dual variable of (2), i.e., non-negative, signifies the 
marginal value of increasing a specific generator’s maximum 
capacity. Three cases can potentially exist in this context, while 
remembering that the lower bounds of all generators are 
assumed to be zero for this simplified DCOPF problem: 1) if a 
generator is producing, but not at its maximum capacity (i.e., 
𝛼𝑛 = 0 by complementary slackness), then the LMP at the node 
of the generator is equal to its marginal cost (by complementary 
slackness); 2) if a generator is not producing anything (i.e., 
𝛼𝑛 = 0 by complementary slackness), then the LMP at its node 
is less than or equal to its marginal cost; and 3) if the generator 
is producing at its maximum capacity (i.e., 𝛼𝑛 ≥ 0), then the 
LMP at its node is greater than (when 𝛼𝑛 > 0) or equal (when 
𝛼𝑛 = 0) to its marginal cost (by complementary slackness). 
These results match with a simple economic interpretation of 
the shadow price for (2). Whenever you are not producing at 
your maximum capacity the short-term marginal benefit to 
increase your capacity beyond its existing capability is zero. 
When you are operating at your maximum capacity, the short-
term marginal benefit to increase your capacity by 1 MW is 
equal to the difference between your LMP and your marginal 
cost; keep in mind that this explanation applies to the presented 
primal DCOPF formulation. If the presented formulation 
included other constraints that could restrict the generator’s 
output, e.g., ramp rate limits, then the description would be 
more complex. In general, note that if the DCOPF is formulated 
differently, the dual will not be the same and may result in 
different interpretations of that different dual. 
IV.  RECENT INDUSTRY MOVEMENTS TO MODEL GENERATOR 
CONTINGENCIES IN MARKET 
A.  Primal Formulation of the Enhanced DCOPF Problem 
To meet NERC’s N-1 mandate more appropriately, recent 
literature suggests enhancing generator contingency modeling 
by ensuring post-contingency transmission security through an 
explicit representation of post-contingency congestion patterns 
for critical generator contingencies within the market auction 
models [4], [5], [8], [9]. The mathematical (primal) auction 
formulation for the enhanced DCOPF problem, motivated by 
the optimization problem proposed by CAISO in [8], is detailed 
below. Extensions to this work can be made to analyze other 
attempts to introduce more advanced corrective control actions. 
 
Minimize
𝑃𝑛,𝐷𝑛
: ∑ 𝑐𝑛𝑃𝑛𝑛    (10) 
Subject to: 
−𝑃𝑛 ≥ −𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 , ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑁            (𝜶𝒏) (11) 
∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 (𝑃𝑛𝑛 − 𝐷𝑛) ≥ −𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑎 , ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾  (𝑭𝒌
−) (12) 
−∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 (𝑃𝑛𝑛 − 𝐷𝑛) ≥ −𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑎, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾  (𝑭𝒌
+) (13) 
∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 (𝑃𝑛 + 𝐺𝐷𝐹𝑛′(𝑐),𝑛𝑃𝑛′(𝑐) − 𝐷𝑛)𝑛 ≥ −𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐 , ∀𝑘 ∈
𝐾𝑐𝑟𝑡 , 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
  (𝑭𝒌
𝒄−) (14) 
−∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 (𝑃𝑛+𝐺𝐷𝐹𝑛′(𝑐),𝑛𝑃𝑛′(𝑐) − 𝐷𝑛)𝑛 ≥ −𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐, ∀𝑘 ∈
𝐾𝑐𝑟𝑡 , 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
  (𝑭𝒌
𝒄+) (15) 
∑ 𝑃𝑛𝑛 − 𝐷𝑛 = 0,  (𝜹) (16) 
𝐷𝑛 = 𝐷𝑛̅̅̅̅ , ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑁            (𝝀𝒏) (17) 
𝑃𝑛 ≥ 0. 
where: 
𝐺𝐷𝐹𝑛′(𝑐),𝑛 =
{
 
 
 
 
−1, 𝑛 = 𝑛′(𝑐)
0, 𝑛 ≠ 𝑛′(𝑐) ⋏ 𝑛 ∉ 𝑆𝐹𝑅
𝑢𝑛𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥
∑ 𝑢𝑛𝑃𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑛∈𝑆𝐹𝑅
𝑛≠𝑛′(𝑐)
, 𝑛 ≠ 𝑛′(𝑐) ⋏ 𝑛 ∈ 𝑆𝐹𝑅
 
 ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
. (18) 
 
In this formulation, the generation loss is distributed across 
the system via GDFs and is presumed to be lossless. Also, it is 
prorated based on the maximum online (frequency responsive) 
capacity, to approximate the actual system behavior, while 
ignoring capacity and ramp rate restrictions [8]. Equation (18) 
provides CAISO’s definition for GDFs, which is proposed to 
estimate the effect of generation loss and the associated system 
response on critical transmission assets in the post-contingency 
state. The post-contingency dc power flow (under a critical 
generator outage) on a critical transmission asset is restricted by 
its emergency rating (rate C) in (14) and (15) respectively. The 
remainder of the formulation is consistent with the standard 
DCOPF formulation. Note that GDF is constructed to denote 
the outage of generation at a specific node, not to distinguish 
between the outage of a single generator at a node with multiple 
generators. Lastly, CAISO’s actual market model will be more 
complex than what is presented in (10)-(18), which does not 
include other modeling issues like transmission continency 
modeling, reserve requirements, ramp rate limits, etc. The 
formulation is kept in a simpler manner to focus on the key 
proposed change, which is related to the inclusion of the 
generator contingency modeling with the use of the GDFs. 
B.  Dual Formulation for the Enhanced DCOPF Problem 
The corresponding dual problem formulation is described 
below. Note that, while the following dual is derived based on 
the formulation in Section IV.A, other primal formulations are 
also possible, and the dual formulations will change as well. 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝛼𝑛,𝐹𝑘
−,𝐹𝑘
+,𝐹𝑘
𝑐−,𝐹𝑘
𝑐+,𝛿,𝜆𝑛
: −∑ (𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛼𝑛)𝑛 − ∑ (𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑎(𝐹𝑘
− + 𝐹𝑘
+))𝑘   
−∑ (𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐(𝐹𝑘
𝑐− + 𝐹𝑘
𝑐+))𝑘∈𝐾𝑐𝑟𝑡,
𝑐∈𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
+ ∑ (𝐷𝑛̅̅̅̅ 𝜆𝑛)𝑛     (19) 
Subject to: 
−𝛼𝑛 + ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 (𝐹𝑘
− − 𝐹𝑘
+)𝑘 + (∑ (𝐹𝑘
𝑐− −𝑘∈𝐾𝑐𝑟𝑡,
𝑐∈𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
𝐹𝑘
𝑐+)(𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 + ?̅?𝑛′(𝑐),𝑛 ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑠
𝑅 𝐺𝐷𝐹𝑛′(𝑐),𝑠𝑠∈𝑁 )) + 𝛿 ≤
𝑐𝑛 , ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑁   (𝑷𝒏) (20) 
∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 (𝐹𝐾
+ − 𝐹𝑘
−)𝑘 +∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 (𝐹𝐾
𝑐+ − 𝐹𝑘
𝑐−)𝑘∈𝐾𝑐𝑟𝑡,
𝑐∈𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
−
𝛿 + 𝜆𝑛 = 0, ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑁  (𝑫𝒏) (21) 
𝛼𝑛 ≥ 0, 𝐹𝑘
− ≥ 0, 𝐹𝑘
+ ≥ 0, 𝐹𝑘
𝑐− ≥ 0, 𝐹𝑘
𝑐+ ≥ 0, 𝛿 free, 𝜆𝑛 free.  
where: 
?̅?𝑛′(𝑐),𝑛 = {
0, 𝑛 ≠ 𝑛′(𝑐)
1, 𝑛 = 𝑛′(𝑐)
, ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
    (22) 
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𝜆𝑛 = 𝛿 + ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 (𝐹𝑘
−
𝑘 − 𝐹𝑘
+) + ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 (𝐹𝑘
𝑐−
𝑘∈𝐾𝑐𝑟𝑡,
𝑐∈𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
−
𝐹𝑘
𝑐+), ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑁.  (𝑫𝒏) (21a) 
 
The dual objective now has an additional term, i.e., the third 
component in (19), which represents the post-contingency 
congestion rent resulting from generator contingency modeling. 
Constraints (20) and (21) represent the dual constraints 
corresponding to the generator production and the demand 
variables in the enhanced primal problem respectively. The 
primary impact that the proposed changes will have on market 
pricing is how it affects the LMPs. Constraint (21) within the 
dual problem identifies 𝜆𝑛  as the LMP at node n, which is 
further defined in (21a) and is equal to the sum of the marginal 
energy component, the marginal pre-contingency congestion 
component, and an additional marginal post-contingency 
congestion component that comes from the modeling of critical 
generator contingencies. 
Note that, the enhanced primal problem defined by (10)-(18) 
differs from CAISO’s primal problem in [8] with respect to the 
following aspects. 1) The demand is first treated as a variable 
following which it is fixed to equal a parameter in (17) to enable 
the derivation of the LMP in a simpler manner. 2) The losses 
are ignored for simplification. 3) No new variables are 
introduced to denote the real power production from the 
system’s resources under a specific generator contingency. 4) 
Transmission contingency security constraints are ignored to 
allow the derivation in this paper to focus on generator 
contingency modeling in a clear and concise manner. 
C.  Analyzing the Dual Formulation 
To understand what is communication by the aforesaid dual 
problem, first, start with the objective functions of the primal 
and the dual. Linear optimization theory includes strong 
duality, which guarantees that the objective of the primal 
problem equals the objective of the dual problem at optimality. 
Achieving strong duality means there is no duality gap. Another 
way to interpret the strong duality relationship is through its 
expression of an exchange of money; payments and expenses 
resulting from the auction and the corresponding exchange of 
goods and services. There is the obvious piece from the 
objective of the primal problem, which is the total generation 
cost. The next obvious piece is the last term of the dual 
objective, which is the load payment, LMP times consumption.  
The first term of the dual objective is the short-term generator 
profit for a generator at node 𝑛, summed over all nodes, or the 
system-wide generation rent. The second and third terms in the 
dual’s objective represent the system-wide congestion rent; this 
is to be expected as it relates the flowgate marginal price to the 
line flow, once complementary slackness is applied. 
The discussion that follows analyzes the corresponding 
impact on the rent and the revenue for generators that are and 
are not included in the assumed set of critical generator 
contingencies. Recall first that GDF reflects the anticipated 
system response from a specific node in the network and the 
way it is structured in (18) assumes that there is only one unit 
at most at a node (easily modifiable). Second, note the formula 
to define the GDF is based purely on the generator’s capacity 
relative to the rest of the fleet’s capacity (for units that are 
frequency responsive). One obvious drawback of the proposed 
GDF is that it ignores the generator’s capacity, the generator’s 
ramp rate restrictions, and whether the ISO procured the 
necessary reserve product from the unit. As a result, this model 
assumes there is the capability to inject power at a node based 
on the definition of the GDF, not necessarily based on the actual 
ability for the generator to provide the needed reserve; for 
instance, a generator may be operating at its maximum capacity. 
The assumed GDF only accounts for capacity while not 
capturing the dispatch set point of the unit or whether the unit 
has been obligated to provide contingency reserve products 
(note that while the presented auction formulation does not 
include reserve procurement, the GDF itself does not reflect 
whatsoever on reserve and, as such, the impact of reserve is not 
captured anyway). Finally, the GDF shows up only in (14) and 
(15) and it is multiplied by the MW dispatch variable for the 
generator that is modeled to be under outage (or contingency). 
This translates into the post-contingency congestion for a 
generator outage, in the primal problem, to being directly 
related to the dispatch variable for the contingency generator 
only. For example, assume that generator 1 is lost, which is 
located at bus 1. Assume that generator 2 is anticipated to 
completely pick up this entire loss of supply from generator 1 
(so the ISO sets the GDF = 1 for generator 2) and generator 2 is 
at bus 2. Even though generator 2 is the unit anticipated to 
provide the needed injection, the functional form in (14) and 
(15) relate the change in the injection at bus 2 to be determined 
by the GDF (a fixed input parameter) and the output of 
generator 1. The GDF is basically masking the response that is 
provided by generator 2 for generator 1’s drop in supply. Thus, 
?̅? reduces to zero in (20) for generators that are not located at 
the nodes of the generators contained within the critical 
generator contingency list. 
More importantly, the post-contingency congestion and the 
component of the LMPs that are reflective of this post-
contingency state are driven by the cost of the generator that is 
lost; it is not driven by the cost that is associated to the 
generators that would respond. From a power engineering 
perspective, capturing the costs of the units responding does not 
fully matter in regard to ensuring a secure system; the primal 
problem captures the change in injection for the buses that are 
anticipated to have an increase in production when responding 
to the outage. From a cost perspective, it has an impact as the 
cost is only related to the generator that is lost and not the units 
that respond. For instance, suppose that the only generator 
contingency that is explicitly modeled is a large, baseload unit 
like a nuclear unit. Such baseload units are often cheaper in 
regard to their marginal cost, $/MWh. On the other hand, the 
units that are likely to respond will be units that have fast 
ramping capabilities and are flexible; those are units that are 
generally more expensive. With this example it is clear that, at 
the very least, there is a high probability that the units that are 
chosen to be in the critical contingency list may be rather 
distinct in characteristics, and costs, than the units that are 
expected to respond. This is important since, again, the cost in 
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the post-contingency state is not driven by the units responding 
but by the unit that is lost. At the same time, the model does not 
acknowledge any costs due to re-dispatch of generators in the 
post-contingency state. Only the pre-contingency costs are 
considered, which makes the impact of the post-contingency 
congestion a secondary influencing factor; the cost changes 
only by forcing a different pre-contingency dispatch set point 
that is secure rather than acknowledging the change in dispatch 
cost due to activation of reserve. Last, it is also equally 
important, if not more, to acknowledge the influence this has on 
the prices, via duality theory, that are then produced by this 
proposed reformulation by CAISO. This paper does not dive 
deeper into this potential problematic issue since that is a topic 
that will require much more research and investigation, as 
identified in the future work in Section V. 
For generators that are not included in the critical list, using 
the definition of ?̅? from (22) and the LMP for that generator’s 
location (𝜆𝑛) from (21a), (20) can be rewritten as (20a). Thus, 
(8a) and (20a) are similar with the exception that the LMP is 
now capturing an added, new congestion component reflecting 
congestion in the post-contingency operational state with the 
loss of a generator. Complementary slackness is then applied to 
the constraint-dual variable pair in (20a) to create (23). It is 
noteworthy to emphasize that (23) turns out to be identical to 
what would be obtained by applying complementary slackness 
to (8a), which again allows for the determination of the 
generator rent. Complementary slackness can also be applied to 
(11) to form (24). Then, based on (23) and (24), the generator 
rent for a generator that is not in the assumed critical generator 
contingency list is given by (25). The short-term generator 
profit (or generator rent) that will be earned by the non-critical 
generators is equal to the generator revenue less the generator 
cost. This generator rent term is basically identical to what is 
seen from the standard DCOPF formulation excepting that the 
LMP has an additional congestion component. 
 
−𝛼𝑛 + 𝜆𝑛 ≤ 𝑐𝑛            (𝑷𝒏) (20a) 
−𝛼𝑛𝑃𝑛 + 𝜆𝑛𝑃𝑛 = 𝑐𝑛𝑃𝑛   (23) 
−𝑃𝑛𝛼𝑛 = −𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛼𝑛 , ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑁   (24) 
𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛼𝑛 = 𝜆𝑛𝑃𝑛 − 𝑐𝑛𝑃𝑛 .   (25) 
 
For the critical generators, using the definition of ?̅?  from 
(22) and the LMP for that generator’s location (𝜆𝑛) from (21a), 
(20) can be rewritten as (20b). Complementary slackness is then 
applied to the constraint-dual variable pair in (20b) to create 
(26). Then based on (26) and (23), the generator rent for a 
generator that is contained within the assumed critical generator 
contingency list is given by (27). 
It is pertinent to note that the LMP defined in (21a) is 
consistent with CAISO’s LMP definition in [8] for the nodes 
that do not have critical generators. Furthermore, CAISO’s 
LMP definition for the nodes that do have critical generators, 
i.e., whose outages are modeled explicitly, is provided below in 
(21b). Note that there is a resemblance in the last term of the 
profit function (within square brackets) for the generators that 
are included in the critical contingency list in (27) and the last 
term of CAISO’s LMP definition in (21b). This entails a 
detailed investigation into the net revenue stream for the 
generators that are contained within the assumed critical 
generator contingency list. 
 
−𝛼𝑛 + 𝜆𝑛 + ∑ [(𝐹𝑘
𝑐− −𝑘∈𝐾𝑐𝑟𝑡,
𝑐∈𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
𝐹𝑘
𝑐+)(∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑠
𝑅 𝐺𝐷𝐹𝑛′(𝑐),𝑠𝑠∈𝑁 )] ≤ 𝑐𝑛    (𝑷𝒏) (20b) 
−𝛼𝑛𝑃𝑛 + 𝜆𝑛𝑃𝑛 + ∑ [(𝐹𝑘
𝑐− −𝑘∈𝐾𝑐𝑟𝑡,
𝑐∈𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
𝐹𝑘
𝑐+)(∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑠
𝑅 𝐺𝐷𝐹𝑛′(𝑐),𝑠𝑠∈𝑁 )] 𝑃𝑛 = 𝑐𝑛𝑃𝑛    (26) 
𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛼𝑛 = 𝜆𝑛𝑃𝑛 − 𝑐𝑛𝑃𝑛 + ∑ [(𝐹𝑘
𝑐− −𝑘∈𝐾𝑐𝑟𝑡,
𝑐∈𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
𝐹𝑘
𝑐+)(∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑠
𝑅 𝐺𝐷𝐹𝑛′(𝑐),𝑠𝑃𝑠𝑠∈𝑁 )].    (27) 
 
CAISO’s LMP definition for nodes with critical generators [8]: 
𝜆𝑛 = 𝛿 + ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 (𝐹𝑘
− − 𝐹𝑘
+)𝑘 + ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑛
𝑅 (𝐹𝑘
𝑐− −𝑘∈𝐾𝑐𝑟𝑡,
𝑐∈𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
𝐹𝑘
𝑐+) + ∑ [(𝐹𝑘
𝑐− − 𝐹𝑘
𝑐+)(∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑠
𝑅 𝐺𝐷𝐹𝑛′(𝑐),𝑠𝑠∈𝑁 )]𝑘∈𝐾𝑐𝑟𝑡,
𝑐∈𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
 
   (21b) 
 
There are a few key issues to consider here. First, note that 
despite the presence of the extra term in (27); (27) describes the 
profit that will be earned by the critical generators. In this 
specific primal reformulation of the DCOPF, described by (10)-
(18), only a single linear operating cost component is 
considered for the production from the generator at node 𝑛. In 
addition, the generator production variable has no other 
restrictions other than lower and upper bound restrictions. 
Analogous to the dual analysis provided for the standard 
DCOPF problem in Section III.B, three cases can potentially 
exist for the generators in this primal reformulation with single 
linear cost coefficients and only lower and upper bounds. (1) If 
a generator is not producing at its maximum capacity, the short-
term marginal benefit (profit) to increase its capacity beyond its 
existing capability is zero. (2) If it is operating at its maximum 
capacity, the short-term marginal benefit to increase its capacity 
by 1 MW is equal to the difference between what it is paid and 
its marginal cost. (3) If it is not producing anything, then what 
it is paid must be less than or equal to its marginal cost. 
Consequently, the penalty (shadow) price of (11), α, does 
completely capture the $/MWh rate for the corresponding unit’s 
profit or the marginal benefit of increasing its maximum 
capacity, which makes 𝛼𝑛𝑃𝑛  (or 𝛼𝑛𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥  by complementary 
slackness) its profit function. Therefore, the net revenue stream 
for a generator should equal the sum of its profit and cost. 
Equation (27a) defines the revenue for the generators that are 
contained within the assumed critical list of generators. 
 
𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛼𝑛 + 𝑐𝑛𝑃𝑛 = 𝜆𝑛𝑃𝑛 + ∑ [(𝐹𝑘
𝑐− −𝑘∈𝐾𝑐𝑟𝑡,
𝑐∈𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
𝐹𝑘
𝑐+)(∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑠
𝑅 𝐺𝐷𝐹𝑛′(𝑐),𝑠𝑃𝑠𝑠∈𝑁 )].    (27a) 
 
Second, if the short-term generator profit for a generator at 
node n, summed over all nodes, is equal to the total generation 
profit, then by strong duality, at optimality (28) holds. In other 
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words, at optimality, the objective of the primal reformulation 
must equal the objective of the dual problem, or the load 
payment is equal to the sum of the total generation cost, the total 
generation profit, and the total congestion rent. 
 
∑ 𝑐𝑛𝑃𝑛𝑛 = −∑ 𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛼𝑛 −∑ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑎(𝐹𝑘
− + 𝐹𝑘
+) −𝑘𝑛
∑ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑐(𝐹𝑘
𝑐−
𝑘∈𝐾𝑐𝑟𝑡,
𝑐∈𝐶𝑔
𝑐𝑟𝑡
+ 𝐹𝑘
𝑐+) + ∑ 𝐷𝑛̅̅̅̅𝑛 𝜆𝑛 .    (28) 
 
If 𝛼𝑛𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 is equal to the short-term generator profit for a 
generator then it implies that (27) describes the profit that will 
be earned by the critical generators, which means that a critical 
unit’s revenue is not just the LMP at its location (𝜆𝑛) times the 
production, but its revenue also includes the added extra (last) 
term in (27). On the contrary, if 𝛼𝑛𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥  is not equal to the 
short-term generator profit and instead a critical unit is only 
paid the LMP at its location (𝜆𝑛) times the production, then its 
profit is equal to LMP at its location (𝜆𝑛) times the production 
less the cost. In this case, the short-term generator profit for a 
generator at node n, summed over all nodes, will not equal the 
term in the dual objective that is supposed to represent the total 
generation profit of the entire system. In other words, this 
would remove the added extra term from its revenue. 
Furthermore, since complementary slackness dictates that (27) 
should hold, which again is the short-term generator profit for 
a generator at node n, summed over all nodes, will not equal the 
total generation profit of the entire system. To summarize, if 
𝛼𝑛𝑃𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 does not denote the short-term generator profit for both 
the critical and the non-critical generators, it will result in an 
ISO that is not revenue neutral. The ISO will either have a 
revenue shortfall overall or surplus. This confirms and clarifies 
what the generators in the assumed critical list should be paid 
and explains the reasoning behind why CAISO is potentially 
including the added extra term in their definition of the LMP at 
the nodes of the critical generators in (21b). However, CAISO’s 
definition of the LMP at the nodes of the critical generators is 
not consistent with the traditional definition of the LMP or the 
LMP that is identified by the corresponding dual formulation. 
The critical generators should now be paid this extra term but 
that does not imply the extra term be included in the LMP since 
this will have associated implications in the FTR markets (note 
that this LMP is further used to settle the FTR payments in the 
FTR markets). Also, note that, in (28), the load pays the LMP 
identified by the dual formulation. Further extension of this 
work is necessary to evaluate more advanced reformulations to 
enhance generator contingency modeling (an example is 
detailed in Section V) and its corresponding effect on market 
prices, settlements, and revenues. 
Third, it is necessary to understand the interpretation and the 
implications of the extra term in (27). If a critical generator is 
under an outage, the GDFs specify that the corresponding 
injections to compensate for the drop in its supply are defined 
based on its value for its locations. Essentially, the extra term 
in the profit function, (27), is what the critical generator is paid 
by the ISO to compensate for the loss of its production. Now, if 
the extra term is combined with the fact that the unit is being 
paid the LMP at its location for its production, what this 
translates into is that the corresponding critical generator is 
basically paying a congestion charge for the difference between 
injecting at its location and instead injecting at the locations 
identified by the GDFs. Thus, the combination of the extra term 
and its LMP component corresponding to the outage is basically 
a congestion transfer cost. Another way to interpret this is that, 
for that particular contingency scenario, the critical generator 
will inject at the locations that are identified by the GDFs 
instead of injecting at its own location. The LMP already 
compensates for the expected injection at its location. The extra 
term is the transfer due to injections based on the pre-defined 
rules of the GDF. Another way to interpret this would be that 
the generator that is lost has storage at each node identified by 
the GDF definition and is expected to compensate for its own 
contingency by injecting at those locations. The model still 
acknowledges that the generator is producing; it is just 
producing now magically at different locations. As such, the 
dual formulation suggests that the unit should be compensated 
exactly by that (invalid) assumption. The right way to make this 
work is to have the critical generator buy from the locations 
identified by the GDF instead or have some sort of a side 
contract with the generators at those locations. This paper 
defines how this pricing structure would work if it is to follow 
the exact prescribed formulation proposed within the primal. 
To assist in understanding the implications, it is helpful to 
go back to (14) and (15). Recall that the GDF shows up only in 
(14) and (15) and it is multiplied by the MW dispatch variable 
for the generator that is lost. This basically simulates the cost of 
a critical generator backing up its loss based on its costs at other 
locations. The fact that the equations are driven based on its 
dispatch variable and not the dispatch variables of the 
responding generators implies that this critical generator’s cost 
influences the duals for this issue and not the cost of the 
responding generators. Thus, the responding generators do not 
affect the outcome for the generator that is lost. This is an 
important implication because this is sensitive to which 
generators are chosen to be included in the list of critical 
generator contingencies. CAISO acknowledges this concern by 
stating that analogous to how transmission security constraints 
are selectively enforced in contemporary markets, the ISO will 
decide which generators are critical and need to be explicitly 
modeled based on engineering analysis and outage studies [8]. 
Finally, the definition of congestion rent is the flowgate 
marginal price times the flow on the line, summed over all lines. 
Congestion rent can be also identified by the difference in load 
payment and the generation revenue; it is easy to confirm that 
these two approaches provide the same value for the congestion 
rent as strong duality provides a formula where generation cost 
(the primal objective) is equal to the load payment minus the 
generation rent (short-term generation profit) minus the 
congestion rent at optimality. This can be more easily identified 
by applying strong duality to the simplified DCOPF and its 
dual, (1) and (7). For the more complicated primal 
reformulation auction model that includes security constraints 
associated to generator contingencies, it becomes more 
complex; the congestion rent can be identified by taking (12)-
(15) and applying complementary slackness. Thus, the system-
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wide congestion rent in this case is equal to the second and third 
terms in the dual’s objective, (19); this is to be expected as it 
relates the flowgate marginal price to the line flow, once 
complementary slackness is applied. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper presents a comprehensive theoretical analysis of 
the recent industry movements, specifically, CAISO’s efforts, 
to model generator contingencies in market models more 
appropriately. The main intention is to examine (and question) 
and complement the movement in the industry to enhance 
generator contingency modeling and to analyze the market 
impact of the policies that are proposed in this realm of 
research. It is noteworthy to emphasize that if the primal 
(DCOPF problem in this context) is formulated differently, the 
dual will not be the same and may result in different 
interpretations of that different dual. As this paper has 
demonstrated, this is why it is very important to perform a 
rigorous evaluation via duality theory to investigate the 
potential implications of the proposed market change. 
Further extensions of the auction formulation presented in 
Section IV is essential to evaluate more advanced 
reformulations to enhance generator contingency modeling and 
its corresponding effect on market prices, settlements, and 
revenues. For instance, it is pertinent to analyze an auction 
reformulation that enhances generator contingency modeling 
by incorporating an explicit representation of post-contingency 
power balance in addition to the previously mentioned post-
contingency transmission security for critical generator 
contingencies. The post-contingency power balance constraints 
will help in assuring system-wide power balance between post-
contingency generation and post-contingency demand. This 
essentially also provides an opportunity to model the expected 
post-contingency demand consumption under the different 
critical generator contingency states. However, the obvious 
setback with such an approach, i.e., the explicit inclusion of 
post-contingency power balance constraints, is the associated 
increase in the computational complexity of the corresponding 
problem. The anticipated impact that the corresponding change 
will have on market pricing is (again) how it affects the LMPs. 
This change will result in an LMP at a node for each of the 
modeled critical generator contingency states. In addition, it is 
also important to analyze the corresponding effect on the 
market settlements and revenues. 
The explicit consideration of credible generator 
contingencies in general is expected to result in fewer ex-post 
OMCs (or adjustments), which is technologically and 
economically beneficial [4], [5], [7]. The explicit consideration 
of credible generator contingencies (and fewer ex-post 
adjustments) enable the market auction to optimize more of the 
market, which, in turn, results in improvements in market 
efficiency and improved price signals [4], [5]. 
Future research should include implementing and testing the 
effectiveness of the proposed enhancements in improving the 
market surplus on a large-scale test system. Furthermore, to 
overcome the issues identified in this chapter, future work 
should examine the market implications of the generator 
contingency modeling approach proposed by MISO in [9] and 
identify a means to extend MISO’s approach to include both 
intra-zonal and inter-zonal transmission assets in addition to 
modeling more than one critical generator contingencies per 
reserve zone. The next steps should also investigate new means 
to introduce corrective actions via different reformulations and 
the associated market impacts. 
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